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I. Introduction
In January 2011, the California Supreme Court ruled in People v.
Diaz that police officers do not need a warrant to search a portable
1
electronic device incident to a lawful arrest. Moreover, the officers
need not have probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that the
device contains evidence or other information pertinent to the crime
2
of arrest. The court justified its ruling by relying on United States
Supreme Court precedent in the area of Fourth Amendment search
and seizure doctrine, citing to well-known and decades-old cases for
3
support. With the United States Supreme Court unwilling to clarify
exactly how new technology should be dealt with under the Fourth
Amendment, perhaps the high court of California did the best that it

*

University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.
1. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011).
2. Id. at 503.
3. Id. at 504.
331

332

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:2

could under the circumstances. If this was the case, the California
legislature did not agree.
After the Diaz decision in January, Senator Mark Leno, a
Democrat representing San Francisco, took matters into his own
4
hands and drafted Senate Bill 914. In short, the bill would have
overturned the Court’s decision and required law enforcement to
obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate before searching
5
The bill passed with
arrestees’ portable electronic devices.
overwhelming support from both political parties in the State
Assembly and State Senate and needed only Governor Brown’s
6
signature or tacit approval to become law. Governor Brown vetoed
the bill in October 2011, stating, “[t]he courts are better suited to
resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional
7
search-and-seizure protections.”
This note will first provide a brief summary of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure doctrine, specifically the warrant
requirement and its existing exceptions. It will then discuss the
current state of the law regarding searching portable electronic
devices and suggest what approach the United States Supreme Court
should adopt to resolve the confusion surrounding the issue. The
second half of the Note will take a closer look at Senate Bill 914,
including its legislative history, why it is necessary, and possible
unstated reasons why it was vetoed. Lastly, the Note will argue that
Governor Brown should not have vetoed Senate Bill 914 based on his
given explanation, because the legislature, rather than the courts,
should resolve complex technological issues.

II. Background
A cell phone is no longer merely a portable version of the
8
landline telephones from previous generations. In fact, today’s
smartphones tend to more closely resemble a computer rather than a
9
regular telephone. In addition to making phone calls, smartphones

4. S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Governor
Edmund
Brown,
Veto
Message
(Oct.
9,
2011),
http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_914_Veto_message.pdf.
8. S.B. 914 § 1(b), 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
9. Id.; Smartphones are defined as modern cell phones that “[provide] digital voice
service… text messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 players,
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can access the Internet via mobile networks or a wireless hotspot,
take pictures and videos, download and play music and videos, access
bank accounts, provide navigation assistance, access a remote storage
10
hard drive, and perform a myriad of other functions. Remarkably,
new applications for smartphones even allow users to check the oil
and tire pressure in their vehicles, along with turning on, locking, and
11
unlocking the car. Developers are currently working on cell phones
that have all of the same capabilities as laptops, providing a
12
Moreover, with
convenient substitute for personal computers.
access to any remote storage drive or data sharing system such as
iCloud, it is possible to access every file stored on a home computer
13
or virtual network from anywhere with Internet access.
DigitalBuzzBlog reports that an estimated 4 billion mobile
phones were in use worldwide in 2011, and 1.08 billion of those
14
phones were smartphones. In the United States alone, nine out of
15
ten people are mobile phone subscribers. This number does not
even include other portable electronic devices, such as iPads or
tablets, which provide mobile Internet access without phone calling
16
capabilities.
Needless to say, mobile phones are widely used in society today
and people are extremely dependent on them. Individuals and
businesses alike have grown to depend on them for communicating
17
important (and not so important) information on the go. With such
a rapidly developing medium, it is not surprising that state and federal
law have not kept up with the advancing technology. However, what

video viewing and often video calling. In addition to their built-in functions, smartphones
can run myriad applications, turning the once single-minded cellphone into a mobile
computer.”
Definition
of:
Smartphone,
PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Smartphone&i=51537,00.asp
(last
visited on Feb. 10, 2012).
10. iPhone, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/iphone/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
11. CES: Coming Soon: Control Car Functions from Smartphone with AutoBot,
CNET.COM, (Oct. 27, 2010, 10:16 AM), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13746_7-2002081648.html.
12. Smart Phone Functions Seep Into All Sectors, PHYSORG.COM (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-01-smart-functions-seep-sectors.html.
13. iCloud, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
14. Infographic: Mobile Statistics, Stats & Facts 2011, DIGITALBUZZBLOG (Apr. 4,
2011),
http://www.digitalbuzzblog.com/2011-mobile-statistics-stats-facts-marketinginfographic/.
15. Statistics: The Growth of Mobile into 2011, DIGITALBUZZBLOG, (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://www.digitalbuzzblog.com/mobile-statistics-2011-growth-of-mobile/
16. iPad, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/ipad/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
17. See iPhone, supra note 10.
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is surprising—and alarming—is just how far behind the law is, and
what this means for the privacy rights of billions of Americans.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent actions suggest that it
is in no hurry to take on the challenge of applying the Fourth
Amendment’s search and seizure doctrine to twenty-first century
technology. For example, in recent terms, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari to both State v. Smith and People v. Diaz, leaving a split
amongst the states as to whether warrantless searches of cell phones
18
incident to arrest are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, although the Court could have provided guidance in the
area of modern technology when it decided the case United States v.
19
Jones this year, the opinion supplied very little direction.
In Jones, the Court determined whether law enforcement’s
attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) to a car was a
20
While the Court
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.
determined that attaching the device to the car was indeed a search,
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion did so by focusing on the physical
trespass rather than the information electronically transmitted from
21
the device. Because GPS technology involves the use of digital
information, much like cell phones and other modern developments,
the Court could have taken this opportunity to provide guidance as to
22
when a warrant is necessary when dealing with novel technologies.
Justice Alito’s concurrence recognized the limitations in the
plurality opinion, pointing out that the issue was actually the use of
the information gathered from the GPS rather than the physical
23
attachment of the device. Furthermore, Justice Alito questioned
whether the trespass theory used by the plurality would be of any
help to future electronic searches that do not involve a physical

18. State v. Smith, 920 N.E. 2d 949 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 102 (2010);
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 94 (2011).
19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
20. Id. at 948.
21. Id. at 949.
22. U.S. v. Jones: The Battle for the Fourth Amendment Continues,
HUFFINGTONPOST, (Jan. 24, 2012, 7:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-wwhitehead/us-v-jones-surveillance-technology_b_1224660.html. “The Court should have
clearly delineated the boundaries of permissible surveillance within the context of rapidly
evolving technologies and reestablishing the vitality of the 4th amendment. Instead the
justices relied on an ‘18th century guarantee against un-reasonable searches, which we
believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was
adopted.’” (quoting Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 953.).
23. Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 958–59 (Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, JJ., concurring).

2013]

PEOPLE V. DIAZ. SENATE BILL 914, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

335

intrusion. 24 The Supreme Court has previously ruled that, when
interpreting the holding of a plurality decision, “the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
25
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” In this case,
the rule appears to be only that attaching a GPS device to a car is
indeed a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Jones provided the perfect opportunity to answer the increasingly
important question regarding when cell phones and other portable
electronic devices can constitutionally be searched and seized by the
government. Unfortunately, the Court’s plurality avoided this issue
26
to the best of its ability. The plurality of Justices ignored the
difficult issue of electronically transmitted information and instead
reiterated what was already known: that a physical intrusion by the
government onto an individual’s property is indeed a search under
27
With the Supreme Court currently
the Fourth Amendment.
unwilling to create a new rule for cell phones and other portable
electronic devices, lower courts are left struggling to fit new
technology into old Fourth Amendment precedent.

III. The Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Doctrine
As a preliminary issue, it is important to recognize how cell phone
searches fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The text
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
28
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .” One
way cell phones fit into the scope of the Fourth Amendment is under
the “papers and effects” language. Depending on how advanced their
technology, cell phones can hold or access an unlimited number of
digital files, the equivalent of actual papers being scanned and
29
uploaded onto a server. The “paper” analysis is not limited to
smartphones, as non-smartphones may still contain text messages and
30
phone numbers. This information is comparable to written address

24. Id.
25. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (opn. of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)).
26. See generally Jones,132 S.Ct. at 957.
27. Id.
28. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. See iCloud, supra note 13.
30. The
Evolution
of
Cell
Phone
Design
Between
1983-2009,
WEBDESIGNERDEPOT.COM, http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/05/the-evolution-ofcell-phone-design-between-1983-2009/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012), (showing that even non-
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books and notes or letters of the Framers’ era. Just because the
papers are now in a digital form does not mean they exceed the scope
of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. It would have been
impossible for the drafters to have included “digital information” in
the text of the Fourth Amendment, because such technology was not
31
conceived when the Amendment was ratified in 1791.
The second way in which the Fourth Amendment covers cell
phones is that the Amendment’s protections extend beyond a
person’s physical effects and to instances where the person has a
32
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” In Katz v. United States, the
Court held that conversations made inside a public phone booth were
protected, stating, “[t]”he Fourth Amendment protects people—and
33
not simply ‘areas.’” If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
a verbal conversation made inside a public phone booth, surely that
expectation applies to information stored inside a private cell phone.
In sum, whether textually or via case law, cell phones are within the
Fourth Amendment’s reach and are thus protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
A. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that searches performed
without a warrant are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
34
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” One of
these exceptions is the search incident to arrest, as established in
35
Chimel v. California. In Chimel, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
upon a lawful arrest, officers were justified in searching the arrestee’s
36
person and the area within his “immediate control.” For a while, the
justifications for the incident to the arrest exception seemed to differ
in theory and in practice. Initially, these searches were allowed
without a warrant in order to ensure officer safety, prevent escape,

smartphones have SMS capabilities); Definition of SMS Text Messaging: What is SMS
Messaging,
Text
Messaging?,
ABOUT.COM,
http://cellphones.about.com.od/phoneglossary/g/smstextmessage.htm, (last visited Feb. 12,
2012).
31. Historic
Documents,
USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/amendments.htm#amend04, (last visited Feb. 12,
2012)
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 353. (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 347.
35. Chimel v.California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
36. Id..
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and preserve evidence. 37 A year later, however, the three
38
justifications were downplayed in United States v. Robinson. There,
the Court held that, while the search was initially based on one of the
Chimel justifications, whether a search incident to arrest is later found
valid “does not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability . . . that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
39
the person of the suspect.” The Court reasoned that when an
individual is lawfully arrested, the search of the arrestee is reasonable
40
Robinson expanded law
under the Fourth Amendment.
enforcement’s power in conducting searches incident to arrest,
allowing officers to perform searches even when there was no present
41
danger or risk of evidence destruction.
Law enforcement held this power until recently, when the Court
42
decided Arizona v. Gant in 2009. In Gant, the defendant was
arrested for driving with a suspended license and placed in handcuffs
43
in the back of a patrol car. The police proceeded to search the
vehicle and found drugs in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat of
44
the car. Although the search was incident to the arrest, none of the
45
justifications enunciated in Chimel applied in this case. The arrestee
could not have destroyed evidence, reached for a weapon, or escaped
46
from his position in the back of the police vehicle. Justice Stevens
wrote, “[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the
area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications
for the search incident to the arrest exception are absent and the rule
47
Thus, while cases still cite to Robinson’s
does not apply.”
deferential ruling, it seems as if Chimel’s justifications are once again
48
alive and well.

37. Id.
38. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
41. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237.
42. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
43. Id. at 335.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 337–38, 339.
47. Id. at 339.
48. Courts may still cite to Robinson because they understand that it is impractical to
judge the searching officers’ decisions in hindsight. If the officers legitimately believed one
of the Chimel justifications existed at the time of the search, courts may not want to punish
them or the prosecution by looking to actual probability when determining the
admissibility of the evidence recovered.
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B. Case Law: When are Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Constitutional?

Without guidance from the United States Supreme Court, the
district and state courts have naturally been all over the map trying to
apply search incident to the arrest doctrine to cell phones and other
49
The majority of decisions find that law
novel technologies.
enforcement may constitutionally search cell phones incident to arrest
50
without a warrant. On the other hand, recent cases criticize the
analysis of these decisions and make a compelling argument for
considering warrantless cell phone searches a violation of the Fourth
51
Amendment. Two cases, United States v. Finley and Ohio v. State,
provide an example of how lower courts are grappling with applying
old law to new technological situations.
In the 2007 case United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a warrantless search of Finley’s cell phone incident to
52
an arrest for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
The court cited Robinson, stating that police officers “may also,
without any additional justification, look for evidence of the
53
arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”
Attempting to fit new technology into old precedent, the court then
referred to the Supreme Court case New York v. Belton, which
54
established the “container doctrine.” Belton held that, incident to
arrest, “police may search containers, whether open or closed, located
55
within the arrestee’s reach.” Because the Finley court found the cell
56
phone analogous to a container, the search was valid.

49. See generally Smallwood v. State, 61 So.3d 448, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011);
People v. Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84,88 (2011); Fawdry v. State, 70 So.3d 626, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011), Gracie v. State, 92 So. 3d 806 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 307
Ga. App. 253, 253-54 (2010), cert. granted 290 Ga. 785 (2012); State v. Carroll, 762 N.W.2d
404, 406 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009), United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704 (5th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
50. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 462; Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 at 511; Fawdry, 70 So. 3d at 630;
Gracie, 92 So. 3d at 813; Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 253–54; Carroll, 762 N.W.2d at 411;
Curtis, 635 F.3d at 714; Finley, 477 F.3d at 253.
51. See generally, State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 170-71 (2009); United States v.
Davis, 787 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1172 (D. Or. 2011).
52. Finley, 477 F.3d at 253.
53. Id. at 259-60 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233-34).
54. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)).
55. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460–61(The Court further explained that a lawful arrest
justifies this invasion of privacy.).
56. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260; (See Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011)(applying the container doctrine to uphold cell phone search incident to the arrest.)
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Two years later, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected the
57
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning. In State v. Smith, the court took a closer
look at the Belton container doctrine, and found that it defined a
container as “any object capable of holding another object,”
58
traditionally referring to physical objects. The court decided it was
illogical to apply this definition to cell phones and other similar
electronic devices, which are “capable of storing a wealth of digitized
information wholly unlike any physical object found within a closed
59
container.”
Additionally, the court looked to whether evidence preservation
or officer safety was at stake when the officers searched the cell
60
phone. The burden was on the state to present evidence that the
61
information on the phone was subject to “imminent destruction.”
When the state could not provide such evidence, the court reiterated
the importance of the Chimel justifications and ruled the search
62
unconstitutional.
C. People v. Diaz

People v. Diaz immediately followed State v. Smith, establishing a
discrepancy between California and Ohio Fourth interpretations of
63
In Diaz, the defendant was arrested after
Amendment law.
64
participating in a police informant’s purchase of ecstasy. At the
police station, a detective seized the defendant’s cell phone and
65
placed it with the other evidence. After ninety minutes passed, the
detective searched the phone and found an incriminating text
66
When the defendant filed a motion to exclude this
message.
evidence because the warrantless search violated his Fourth
67
Amendment rights, the trial court ruled against him.
The California Supreme Court ruled that no warrant is necessary
for cell phone searches incident to a lawful arrest, regardless of the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d at 167) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).
Id. at 167 (citing Belton, 431 U.S. at 460).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Diaz, 244 P.3d at 511.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 503.
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lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 68 In an attempt to
comply with existing Fourth Amendment United States Supreme
Court precedent, the Diaz court looked to United States v. Robinson,
United States v. Edwards, and United States v. Chadwick, and decided
the primary issue was whether the cell phone was “immediately
69
associated with [the defendant’s] person.” If so, the search was
constitutional despite the fact that it was ninety minutes after the
70
If the cell phone was found to be property under the
arrest.
immediate control of the individual rather than “on his person,” then
the ninety minute period removed the search from the incident to
arrest category, and the search was unconstitutional without a
71
warrant.
Using language from the existing cases, the court held that the cell
72
phone did fall into the “closely associated with his person” category.
In doing so, the court expressly rejected the defendant’s argument
that the character of the item should be taken into account when
73
deciding the constitutionality of the search. The Diaz majority
noted that no United States Supreme Court decision ever held that
74
the character of the item must be considered.
D. An Analysis and Criticism of Diaz

The three United States Supreme Court cases relied upon by the
Diaz majority were decided decades before cell phones were even
invented. In Robinson, incident to a lawful arrest, a police officer
conducted a pat-down search on the arrestee and found a crumpled
75
up cigarette package in his pocket. When he opened the package,
76
he found heroin capsules. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the search because the police officer had the authority to conduct “a
full search of the arrestee’s person” under the incident to arrest

68. Id. at 502.
69. Id. at 505 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977); (Even
though the Diaz court was also looking at the more specific issue of remoteness in this
case, when the search is no longer “ incident to arrest,” it does not detract from the
discussion on cell phone searches incident to the arrest generally.) See also Robinson, 414
U.S. at 234; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-803 (1974).
70. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
71. Id. at 505–06.
72. Id. at 506.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 504 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222-23).
76. Id.
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exception. 77 In Edwards, ten hours after the defendant was arrested
for attempting to break into a post office, the police officers seized
78
When the defense
and searched the clothes he was wearing.
objected that the length of time between the search and the arrest was
too great to be considered “incident to arrest,” the Court disagreed
79
and upheld the search. Finally, in Chadwick, the defendants had a
large footlocker in the trunk of their car when federal agents lawfully
80
arrested them. Ninety minutes after the arrest, the agents searched
81
the locker without a warrant and found contraband. The Court
created the distinction upon which the Diaz court later relied: a
search “of the person” ninety minutes after arrest can be upheld
under the incident to the arrest exception, while such a search of
82
“possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control” cannot. The
Court ruled that the search of the footlocker was unconstitutional
83
because it was a search “of the person.”
The majority of the Diaz court treated Robinson, Edwards, and
84
Chadwick as controlling precedent to which it must strictly adhere.
In blindly following these cases, the court overlooked fundamental
85
differences that weaken the power of the precedent itself. For
instance, the majority opinion abruptly dismissed the defendant’s
suggestion of looking to the character of a cell phone simply because
no United States Supreme Court case explicitly requires its character
86
be taken into account.
Instead, the Diaz court tried to force this modern situation into
the rigid framework of Chadwick, Edwards, and Robinson by
analogizing a cell phone to a physical container, or even a cigarette
87
package. This is an absurd result. The legal system would not work
77. Id. (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
78. Id. (citing Edwards, 415 U.S. at 801 (1974)).
79. Id. at 504–05 ( citing Edwards, 415 U.S. at 807).
80. Id. at 505(citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4–5 (1977)).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Chadwick 433 U.S. at15).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 506.
85. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly
Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272. (1999). (“Appellate
opinions are only as robust as the facts on which they are based. When those facts
evaporate, the opinion on which they rest is weakened as well.”); But see Diaz, 244 P.3d at
512 (Kennard, Baxter, Corrigan, and George, JJ., concurring) (“In my view, however, the
recent emergence of this new technology does not diminish or reduce in scope the binding
force of high court precedent.”).
86. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
87. Id. at 506–07.
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if lower courts never ventured beyond what was explicitly stated in
Supreme Court decisions. As a practical matter, the United States
Supreme Court cannot update its decisions every time society
changes. Rather, lower courts must be awarded some flexibility in
applying the law so that they can produce reasonable and rational
holdings.
The dissenting opinion in Diaz recognized that existing and
outdated Supreme Court precedent cannot be read so literally when
88
Justice Werdegar
applied to such a vastly different situation.
distinguished cell phones from regular containers by explaining,
“[n]ever before has it been possible to carry so much personal or
89
business information in one’s pocket or purse.” Additionally, she
noted that even United States Supreme Court precedent supports
differentiating cell phones from other containers, which have been
90
traditionally defined as being able to hold another object. She
further pointed out that the Chimel justifications of officer safety and
evidence destruction are not applicable to cell phones like they are to
91
normal containers or clothing.
Werdegar argues that, even if the test the majority applied was
correct (whether the search was “of the person” or “of the
possessions within an arrestee’s control”), the majority erred in
92
deciding that question. She stated that the information contained in
the cell phone is “clearly distinct from the person of the arrestee,”
and that while “[a]n individual lawfully arrested and taken into police
custody necessarily loses much of his or her bodily privacy, [he] does
not necessarily suffer a reduction in the informational privacy that
93
protects the arrestee’s records.”

88. Id. at 513(Werdegar, J., dissenting, quoting Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S.
126, 133 (1944)).(88.Id. at 104. In responding to the concurring opinion, the dissent wrote:
“But where high court precedent is not on all fours with the case at bar, we also must
remember that the language of Supreme Court decisions is to ‘be read in the light of the
facts of the case under discussion’ and that ‘general expressions transposed to other facts
are often misleading.’”).
89. Id. (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 516-17 (Werdegar, J. dissenting) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4).
91. Id. at 514 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“Weapons, of course, may be hidden in an
arrestee’s clothing or in a physical container on the person. But there is apparently no
“app” that will turn an iPhone or any other mobile phone into an effective weapon for use
against an arresting officer (and if there were, officers would presumably seek to disarm
the phone rather than search its data files) . . . Once a mobile phone has been seized from
an arrestee and is under the exclusive control of the police, the arrestee, who is also in
police custody, cannot destroy any evidence stored on it.”).
92. Id. at 517 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 517–18 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
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The majority and concurring opinions in Diaz mistakenly
attempted to force new facts into old law, and infringe upon
Californians’ privacy rights as a result. Justice Werdegar, while
recognizing the state court’s inability to overrule the United States
Supreme Court, correctly realized the need to reevaluate existing
doctrine in light of modern, evolving technology.

IV. Senate Bill 914
Recognizing the impact of the Diaz decision on the privacy rights
of the people of California, Senator Mark Leno of San Francisco
94
introduced Senate Bill 914 in February of 2011. The explicit intent
behind the bill was to “reject as a matter of California statutory law
the rule under the Fourth Amendment . . . announced by the
95
California Supreme Court in People v. Diaz.” The bill passed
unanimously in both houses, with a seventy to zero vote in the
96
Assembly and thirty-two to four vote in the Senate. Despite the
overwhelming bipartisan support, and to the dismay of many
97
Californians, Governor Brown vetoed Senate Bill 914 in October.
The bill would have added Section 1542.5 to the California Penal
Code, prohibiting “the search of information contained in a portable
98
The legislature broadly
electronic device” without a warrant.
defines a “portable electronic device” to include “any portable device
that is capable of creating, receiving, accessing, or storing electronic
99
data or communications.” It is clear that the lawmakers wished to
protect not only cell phones, but also any future technology
warranting the same expectation of privacy.
Section 1 of the bill states, “[t]he right of privacy is fundamental
in a free and civilized society,” and emphasizes the capability of
portable electronic devices to store “an almost limitless amount of

94. Documents associated with SB 914 in the Session, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE,
http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill_number=sb_914&sess=CUR&house=B&site=sen, (last visited Feb. 13,
2012).
95. S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
96. See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 502–03.
97. Brown, supra note 7.
98. S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
(Discussing how many phones are linked to the Internet and have access to servers and
computers anywhere in the world).
99. Id. at § 2(b).
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personal and private information.” 100 Using the language from Katz,
the legislature further argues that people using these devices “have a
reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy” not only in the
information held within the device, but also in the information they
101
can reach via the Internet.” Additionally, the legislature explains
that cell phones do not pose a threat to officer safety, and seizing the
phone until a warrant is issued can preserve any evidence at risk of
102
deletion. In addressing these concerns, the legislature is challenging
the court’s legal analysis by pointing out that the necessary Chimel
103
justifications are not present in these cases.
A. Support and Opposition

Unsurprisingly, Senate Bill 914 had strong supporters and
opponents in both the criminal justice and civil liberty realms. 104 The
following groups supported the bill on the record: the California
Newspaper Publishers Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”), the First Amendment Coalition, California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Californians Aware, California
Broadcasters Association, Compline, LLC, the Electronic Frontier
105
Foundation, and Legal Services for Prisoners with Children.
Arguments made by these groups promote the dissenting opinion in
106
Diaz and the majority opinion in Smith. The ACLU posited that
searching a cell phone “opens a window into every aspect of . . .
private life” including, “political views, financial information,
107
romantic relationships, and medical information.” The newspaper
groups supported Senate Bill 914 for fear that warrantless searches of

100. Id. at § 1(a)-(b).
101. Id. at § 1(b).
102. Id. at § 1(e).
103. Gant, 556 U.S. at 337-38. (Explaining that Chimel justifications are once again
necessary in executing a search incident to the arrest.); You, and Your Smart Phone, Have
a Right to Privacy, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT (June 21, 2011),
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/you-and-your-smart-phone-have-rightprivacy. (Though the bill seeks to overrule the application of the search incident to the
arrest exception to cell phones, it does not treat all other exceptions alike. Leno made
sure to leave the “exigent circumstances” warrant exception intact, explaining that cell
phone searches without a warrant are permitted when “there is an immediate threat to
public safety or the arresting officer.)
104. Bill Analysis, SENATE RULES COMM. 2011-2012 Ses. (2011), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_09010950/sb_914_cfa_20120104_133534_sen_floor.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8–9.

2013]

PEOPLE V. DIAZ. SENATE BILL 914, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

345

their electronic devices would reveal otherwise protected source
108
information.
On the other hand, all of the groups officially opposing the bill
were in the realm of law enforcement, including: the California
District Attorney’s Association, the California Peace Officers
Association, the California State Sheriff Association, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney’s Office, the Peace Officers Research
Association of California, and the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s
109
The Peace Officers Research Association argued that
Office.
overturning the Diaz decision would “restrict their ability to apply the
law, fight crime, discover evidence . . . and protect the citizens of
110
California.”
B. The Veto

Governor Brown’s veto message to the legislature was succinct:
“I am returning Senate Bill 914 without my signature. This
measure would overturn a California Supreme Court decision
that held that police officers can lawfully search the cell
phones of people who they arrest. The courts are better
suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating
111
to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.”
Senator Leno responded by calling the veto message “incoherent”
and reiterated the importance of protecting privacy rights in
112
smartphones, which store a vast amount of private information.
Leno also noted that the legislature has “every right to revisit a
decision by the court,” and that it is the legislature’s duty to make the
113
laws and the judiciary’s job to interpret them. Other bill supporters
have released similar statements, including First Amendment

108. Id. at 9–10 (Article 2 of the California Constitution and section 1040 of the
California Evidence Code protect journalists from forced disclosure of certain
information. Journalist groups contend that these protections would be useless if their
electronic devices could be searched without a warrant incident to the arrest.).
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Brown, supra note 7.
112. California governor allows warrantless search of cell phones, CNNTECH, (Oct. 11,
2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/tech/tech_mobile_california-phone-searchveto_1_cell-phones-smartphone-text-messages?_s=PM:TECH.
113. Brown vetoes bill to limit cell phone searches, SFGATE, (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/10/BA3H1LFOQ6.DTL.
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Coalition Executive Director Peter Scheer. 114 An unsatisfied Scheer
criticized Brown’s logic in passing the responsibility back to the courts
115
when they already gave their “final word” on the matter. Other
critics are skeptical of Brown’s honesty in the message, and wonder if
the decision was made purely because of his close relationship with
116
law enforcement. Many law enforcement groups, including those
that publicly and vigorously opposed Senate Bill 914, donated large
117
amounts of money to Governor Brown’s campaign.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against Governor
Brown’s reasoning is that it is just plain wrong; the legislature is
actually “better suited” than the California Supreme Court to apply
Fourth Amendment protections to novel technologies like cell
phones. Law Professor and Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr
strongly supports this position, concluding, “Governor Brown has it
118
exactly backwards” in his veto justification. The following section
analyzes Professor Kerr’s argument that legislatures, rather than
courts, are the correct forum for deciding Fourth Amendment cases
dealing with new technology.

V. The Legislature is the Correct Venue for Resolving Modern
Technological Issues Under the Fourth Amendment
Governor Brown mistakenly asserts that the judiciary is the best
forum for determining how to apply search and seizure issues to new
119
technology. Although the courts may be competent in upholding
and applying past precedent in other areas, new technology creates a
difficult challenge, as it is rapidly changing and increasingly
ubiquitous in modern society. For the following reasons, the
114. Brown vetoes bill limiting cellphone searches by police, FIRST AMENDMENT
COALITION, (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2011/10/brownvetoes-bill-limiting-cellphone-searches-by-police/.
115. Id. (Peter Scheer comments on Brown’s veto, saying, “The courts have already
addressed the specific issue of searches of cell phones following arrest. The California
Supreme Court’s decision is the final word, not the beginning of a judicial debate.”).
116. Calif. Governor Veto Allows Warrantless Cellphone Searches, WIRED.COM,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/.
117. Id. (citing Contributions to BROWN, JERRY, FOLLOWTHEMONEY,
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/contributor_details.phtml?&c=1166
78&s=CA&y=2010&summary=0&so=a&p=1#sorttable, (Last visited, Feb. 13, 2012).)
(Seven police unions have donated a combined $160,000 to Brown.).
118. Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Oct. 10, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/10/10/governor-brownvetoes-bill-on-searching-cell-phones- incident to the arrest/.
119. Brown, supra note 7.

2013]

PEOPLE V. DIAZ. SENATE BILL 914, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

347

California legislature is the correct forum to decide whether cell
phone searches incident to arrest are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment: 1) the California Supreme Court majority incorporated
outdated notions of technology in Diaz, and 2) the California
legislature is a superior investigatory body than the California
Supreme Court.
A. Technology in People v. Diaz

As discussed earlier in this Note, the court in Diaz applied United
States Supreme Court search and seizure doctrine from the 1970s
when confronted with a twenty-first century case involving cell
120
phones. While the court believed it made perfect legal sense to do
so, the concept seems illogical from a real world, common sense
perspective. The California legislature took the opportunity to enact
legislation using modern notions of privacy and technology. The
court decided the issue in an outdated way and the representatives
disagreed with its decision. Governor Brown should not have vetoed
Senate Bill 914 given the Diaz court’s illogical application of old
Fourth Amendment doctrine to cell phones.
The very nature of the court system necessitates that the decisions
courts make occur “ex post facto”; that is, courts decide issues by
looking at events that have already occurred, rather than predicting
121
what could happen in the future. Superior courts can only decide
Fourth Amendment technology cases after: 1) the government used
such technology to conduct a search, 2) the search produced evidence
that led to an arrest, and 3) the arrestee moved to suppress the
122
evidence gathered. Only after the superior court resolves an issue
can the case move to the court of appeals, and only after that, can the
California Supreme Court choose to exercise its discretionary review
123
over the matter. Thus, it can take years from the actual occurrence
of an issue before the state high court issues a decision.
Applying such a slow-moving system to rapidly changing
technology is irrational. It does little good for the court to create a
124
If the
search rule regarding a technology that is now obsolete.
120. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
121. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868 (2004).
122. Id.
123. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 12.
124. See Kerr, supra note 121, at 869.(“By the time the courts decide how a
technology should be regulated, however, the factual record of the case may be outdated,
reflecting older technology rather than more recent developments.”).
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technology at issue is no longer being used, the court’s decision is
only helpful for predicting how the court will treat the current
technology in the future. In other words, where the issue involves a
rapidly changing medium such as cell phones, court precedent is only
useful to the extent the technology still applies in the future.
Few cases make it to the United States Supreme Court because
the Court can pick and choose from thousands of cases throughout
125
the country. This limits the number of cases lower courts can look
to for guidance and is especially problematic for courts such as the
Diaz court, which felt constrained to follow United States Supreme
Court precedent extremely narrowly. As Stuart Benjamin explains,
“[a]ppellate opinions are only as robust as the facts on which they are
based. When those facts evaporate, the opinion on which they rest is
126
Thus, when there is a limited amount of
weakened as well.”
outdated Fourth Amendment technology cases, lower courts are left
struggling to fit new technology into old precedent.
Legislatures differ greatly from courts in that they do not have to
127
wait before they can act. This means that legislatures can regulate a
128
new technology while it is still relevant to society. Though Senate
Bill 914 was passed in the legislature the same year that Diaz was
decided, the bill was able to use practical knowledge and real world
129
implications in formulating its approach. In doing so, the legislature
did not ignore existing Fourth Amendment doctrine; instead, the text
clearly indicates that the legislature wanted to comply with the
Amendment in affording Californians the privacy rights they are
130
entitled.
While court decisions cannot be quickly reversed if an approach
does not work, legislative bodies can test various regulatory
131
approaches and change law relatively quickly. The legislature has
more flexibility and freedom in regulating changing technologies in
the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context than the courts.
“[C]onsideration of doctrine, history, and function teach that. . .
courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial deference

125. See supra note 123.
126. Benjamin, supra note 85.
127. Kerr, supra note 121, at 870 (“[R]ecent history suggests that legislatures usually
act at a surprisingly early stage, and certainly long before the courts.”]
128. Id.
129. See S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
130. Id.
131. Kerr, supra note 121 at 859.
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when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures
to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement
132
investigations involving new technologies.”
B. The Legislature is a Superior Investigative Body

Legislatures can spend a significantly longer amount of time than
courts learning about new technologies before they enact a
133
regulation. Judges usually have a limited time to consider “a brief
factual record, narrowly argued legal briefs, and a short oral
134
argument.” Because of the time and resource restriction, attorneys
and judges often turn to “the crutch of questionable metaphors” to
135
These
aid their understanding of complex technological issues.
metaphors, often incorrectly applied, can confuse judges down the
136
line and lead to misapplied holdings.
Legislatures, on the other hand, hold multiple hearings in
different committees, consult poll results, and receive input from
137
In the hearings, “legislators analyze,
many independent groups.
consult, debate, and hear testimony from both private and public
138
interests on every bill.” Additionally, the entire legislative process
139
is publicly scrutinized, providing a check on the legislature. The
legislature is also more in touch with the people of the state they
represent. Therefore, in addition to the ability to gather more
information on the technology itself, the legislature can incorporate
society’s views on the matter. In sum, the legislature has many more
informational resources at its disposal than the California Supreme
Court.
C. What the Future Holds

With Senate Bill 914 vetoed, it will remain dead unless the
140
legislature can overturn the veto with a 2/3 vote in each house.
132. Id. at 805.
133. Id. at 875.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. AssemblyMember,
CALIFORNIASTATECAPITOLMUSEUM,
http://www.capitolmuseum.ca.gov/Citizens.aspx?Content2=1060&Content3=1070
(Last
visited March 1, 2012).
139. Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General Warrants, and the Case for the Courts,
10 YALE L.J. & TECH. 120, 140–41, 143 (2007).
STATE
SENATE,
140. Legislative
Process,
CALIFORNIA
http://senate.ca.gov/legislativeprocess#step5, (last visited March 1, 2012).
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Senator Leno has announced that he will try to override the veto next
141
year. Looking at the numbers alone, the high passage rate the first
time around bodes well for overriding the veto. Eventually the
United States Supreme Court will have to grant certiorari to resolve
the issue, unless it decides to leave the question up to each individual
state.

VI. Conclusion
The California legislature abided by the constitution and relevant
United States Supreme Court law when it drafted Senate Bill 914 to
overrule the California Supreme Court. Governor Brown’s veto was
based on the assumption that the courts are the appropriate venue for
making determinations involving new technology. This note argues
that the governor’s statement is incorrect.
When technology is rapidly changing, courts struggle with
applying old precedent to new technology. Because the United States
Supreme Court can only hear so many cases every year, cases on
point with relevant facts are difficult to find. This leaves lower courts,
such as the Diaz court, at a loss when trying to apply Fourth
Amendment search and seizure doctrine to cell phone technology in
2011.
The legislature, on the contrary, is able to regulate technology
before it becomes obsolete. While abiding by the constitutional rules,
the legislature is able to draft legislation that is both relevant to
society at the time and flexible when the law changes. Senate Bill 914
should not have been vetoed, as the California legislature is the more
appropriate place to determine whether a warrantless cell phone
search incident to arrest is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

141. Smart Phones and Privacy, PRIVACYREVOLT!, (Nov.
http://consumercal.blogspot.com/2011/11/smart-phones-and-privacy.html.
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